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THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE
THE SUDDEN EMERGENCY DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA
The courts have been compelled to recognize that an actor who is
confronted with an emergency is not to be held to the standard of
conduct normally applied to one who is in no such situation.
W. Prosser"
The "emergency doctrine" alluded to above is a part of general negligence
law, but it is utilized most frequently in the area of motor vehicle accidents.
The growth of American case law involving emergencies fairly well parallels
the numerical increase of automobiles in the twentieth century.2 This
note will focus on the application of the emergency doctrine to motor vehicle
accident cases in Florida, but the principles to be considered are also
applicable to other emergencies.
FoR WHOM THE DOCTUNE ?
The emergency doctrine is available for use (1) by a civil defendant on
the issue of his primary negligence3 and (2) by the plaintiff on the issue of
his contributory negligence, 4 provided the facts support the application of the
doctrine with respect to the party seeking to have his conduct justified due
to the emergency. 5 The term "actor," as used herein, designates the party
seeking to invoke the emergency doctrine. Thus, the actor, be he plaintiff
or defendant, is one who seeks to have his conduct, at the time of an actual
or apparent emergency, evaluated by a standard of conduct somewhat less
stringent than the standard applicable to "normal," less pressing circum-
stances.
WHY THE DOCTRINE?
Why should the standard of conduct be lowered in an emergency? Even
in the early cases, 6 courts were attempting to answer this question. A New
York case7 in 1874 held that the plaintiff "instinctively" jumped without
looking to avoid being struck by defendant's horse and wagon, thereby hitting
her head against a building. Because she had no time to look around before
jumping, the court deemed plaintiff's "instinctive effort" to avoid the peril
not to be contributory negligence. Going beyond the language of instinctive
1. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs §33, at 171 (3d ed. 1964).
2. Even as late as 1943, it was noted that the problem of care in emergencies had not
yet captured much attention from legal writers. Evans, The Standard of Care in-Emergen-
cies, 31 Ky. L.J. 207, 208 (1943).
3. E.g., Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
4. E.g., Hull v. Laine, 127 Fla. 433, 173 So. 701 (1937).
5. The factual requisites are discussed in the text accompanying notes 19-48 infra.
6. See Evans, supra note 2, for a survey of the earlier emergency cases.
7. Coulter v. American Merchants' Union Express Co., 56 N.Y. 585 (1874).
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effort is a subsequent New York decision, Filippone v. Reisenburger.8 While
working at an excavation, the defendant-employer lost his balance and
grabbed the plaintiff-employee's feet to prevent himself from falling, thereby
injuring the plaintiff. The court stated: "The law presumes that an act or
omission done or neglected under the influence of pressing danger, was done
or neglected involuntarily."9
The use by courts of such concepts as "instinctive effort" and "involuntary
action" may seem to represent a kind of amateur expedition into a complex
and poorly understood area of human psychology. There are untested
assumptions and outright fictions in the use of such rationales for reducing
the required standard of conduct. One would be hard-pressed to ascertain
the extent to which jumping to avoid a horse and wagon consists of instinct
as opposed to reasoned volition. Even more difficult would be an effort to
show that behavior in pressing danger is constituted by acts and omissions
"done or neglected involuntarily."
Though the careless use of psychological jargon may trouble the purist,
it appears that the effect is harmless. As the emergency doctrine has devel-
oped in motor vehicle cases, legal-psychological speculations concerning
"instinct," "impulse," and "involuntary action" probably have not been the
real basis for employing the emergency doctrine. This does not mean that
these terms no longer appear; they still do. For example, in Hormovitis v.
Mutual Lumber Co., 10 having considered the short period of time in which
defendant could have taken evasive action to avoid an accident, the court
stated that he "had opportunity only for instinctive action .. "I" In such
situations, said the court, "the speedy decision which is made is based very
largely upon impulse or instinct."12
The court went a step further and attempted to define what it meant by
action based chiefly on "impulse or instinct":13
Thus in a true emergency or sudden peril situation, the actor appre-
hends danger and stimulates a muscular response to avert it. This is
purposeful action, precipitated by a mental operation, though not on
the plane of conscious deliberation.
Such attempts to analyze the innermost workings of the human organism
are unnecessary to justify a court's use of the emergency doctrine. There is
other reasoning in the Hormovitis opinion that is sufficient to justify the use
of the emergency doctrine in relieving a defendant of liability, namely,
"that the circumstances call for sudden action and that the excitement and
lack of time to think naturally affect the normal action of judgment. ... 14
That the actor has "no time for [unhurried] thought or the weighing of
8. 135 App. Div. 707, 119 N.Y.S. 632 (1909).
9. Id. at 709, 119 N.Y.S. at 634 (emphasis added).
10. 120 So. 2d 42 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
11. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (emphasis added).
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alternative courses of action"'15 is sufficient justification for reducing the legal
expectation of his standard of conduct.16 We need not speculate about the
nature of impulse, instinctive action, involuntary action, or similar concepts
to reach this conclusion.Y7
The contention that shortness of time is itself sufficient basis for justifying
the emergency doctrine is rendered more acceptable in view of the following:
The emergency doctrine is not an exception to the holding of persons to the
"reasonable man" standard of care. Rather, it is a consistent application of
the reasonable man criterion, namely: What would a reasonable man of
ordinary prudence do under the same or similar circumstances ?' Under the
circumstances of a sudden and unexpected emergency, the reason-able man is
not going to be able to reason as thoroughly as he otherwise would, due to the
lack of time.
WHE THE EMERGENCY DOMTRINE?
The Four Requisites
Dupree v. Pitts" enumerated the factual requisites necessary to support
a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine. The court stated:20
[T]he evidence should be sufficient to support a finding (1) that the
claimed emergency actually or apparently existed; (2) that the peril-
ous situation was not created or contributed to by the person con-
fronted, or, as held or stated in many cases, by the tortious act or
conduct of such person; (3) that alternative courses of action in
meeting the emergency were open to such person, or that there was
an opportunity to take some action to avert the threatened casualty;
and (4) that the action or course taken was such as would or might
have been taken by a person of reasonable prudence in the same or a
similar situation. Where there is evidence sufficient to support a
finding as to the existence of such requisites, and procedural require-
ments have been complied with, the instruction should, of course,
be given.
This statement appears to represent the existing law of most states on the
matter 2 1 and has been quoted and utilized by the First and Second District
Courts of Appeal of Florida.22
The four enumerated requisites form an excellent guide to a consideration
of the emergency doctrine. Each merits specific discussion.
15. Id.
16. See W. PaossER, supra note 1, at 171-72.
17. Hormovitis correctly suggests that such "psychological subtleties" would not be
helpful in instructing the jury. 120 So. 2d at 45.
18. See W. PossER, supra note 1, §32, at 154 & n.21, 172.
19. 159 So. 2d 904 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
20. Id. at 907, quoting Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 5, 15-17 (1961).
21. See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 5, 14-22 (1961) (including notes).
22. Ellwood v. Peters, 182 So. 2d 281, 287-88 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Kreiger v. Crowley,
182 So. 2d 20, 21-22 (2d D.C.A. Ma. 1966).
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First Requisite: That the Claimed Emergency Actually or Apparently
Existed. There is no exact definition of an emergency situation beyond say-
ing that there must exist only a very short time for decision and action to
avoid or minimize injury to self or others. Thus, in Hormovitis "the
defendant's driver would have had between 1.8 and 2 seconds to take any
evasive action in an attempt to avoid a collision."23 It is not possible to
quantify the shortness of time necessary to deem an event an emergency. The
implication is clear, however, that the period must be too brief to allow
"ample time for reflection and intelligent choice of means." 24
Since the lack of time must apply to the actor's decisionmaking as well
as to his physical actions, it follows that the emergency, by definition, must
be sudden and unexpected.25 Therefore, it is understandable that the courts
use such terms as "sudden emergency" and "unexpected emergency" inter-
changeably with the unmodified noun "emergency." 26 Florida adheres to the
position that an apparent emergency is sufficient to invoke the emergency
doctrine. In addition to the retention of the apparent emergency situation in
the enumeration of the factual requisites by the First, Second, and Third
District Courts of Appeal, the Florida supreme court had earlier suggested
that "apparent imminent danger" is sufficient to justify a jury instruction.2"
It seems unlikely that acceptance of an apparent emergency as grounds for
reducing the standard of conduct will be revoked in Florida. This is so
both because of its acceptance in other states28 and, more importantly, because
it is fully consistent with the reasonable man standard of care, provided that
the situation would have appeared to be an emergency to a reasonable person.
Second Requisite: That the Perilous Situation Was not Created or
Contributed to by the Person Confronted, or, as Stated in Many Cases, by the
Tortious Act or Conduct of Such Person. (a) Tortious Causation by Actor.
This second requisite is the most crucial of the four. Without it, the emerg-
ency doctrine would be an undeserved legal escape for the negligent or other-
wise tortious defendant.29 Since most casualties are apt to involve an emerg-
ency situation just prior to the catastrophe, it would hardly make sense
23. 120 So. 2d at 45. Likewise, in applying the emergency doctrine, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin noted that "there [were] only two seconds . . .in which Greutzmacher could
decide what, if anything, he had better do, and to do it." Roberts v. Knorr, 260 Wis.
288, 291, 50 N.W.2d 374, 376 (1951).
24. Cook v. Lewis K. Liggett Co., 127 Fla. 369, 374, 173 So. 159, 161 (1937).
25. "The 'emergency doctrine' is applied only where the situation which arises is
sudden and unexpected, and such as to deprive the actor of reasonable opportunity for
deliberation and considered decision." W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 172; accord, Ellwood v.
Peters, 182 So. 2d 281, 284, 288 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
26. E.g., 120 So. 2d at 45-46. The interchangeability of "peril" and "emergency" is
also prevalent. But see infra note 74 concerning the Texas doctrine of "imminent peril."
27. Hainlin v. Budge, 56 Fla. 342, 360, 47 So. 825, 831 (1908). This is the earliest
Florida opinion that deals with the emergency doctrine.
28. See Annot., 80 A.L.R. 2d 5, 15 n.5 (1961).
29. This reasoning applies to the contributorily negligent plaintiff as well. For sim-
plicity, this discussion on the second requisite focuses solely on the defendant's use of the
doctrine.
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to allow one who negligently or otherwise wrongfully caused the emergency
to invoke the emergency doctrine. Even if the actor's conduct in response to
the emergency is blameless, his prior tortious conduct in creating or con-
tributing to the peril is still a substantial causal factor in the resulting injury.
If the facts are sufficiently plausible to support the emergency doctrine, a
defendant in an automobile negligence case may be benefited in either of
two ways: first, if the facts are particularly favorable, the defendant may
persuade the court to rule as a matter of law (1) that the defendant's conduct
prior to the emergency was blameless and (2) that his response to the emerg-
ency was up to that of a reasonable man acting under the same or a similar
situation.30 Second, and more likely, the defendant, though unable to be
exonerated as a matter of law, may receive the benefit of an instruction to
the jury, which informs the jury that if an actual or apparent emergency is
found to exist the defendant is not to be held to the same quality of conduct
after the onset of the emergency as under normal circumstances.8 1 The
troublesome issue that so often arises is whether the defendant's prior conduct
was tortious and created or contributed to the emergency. If the answer is
"yes" as a matter of law, the defendant is dearly not entitled to an instruction
on the altered standard of conduct due to the emergency because he tortiously
created or helped to create the peril.32 Thus, in Bellere v. Madsen33 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that it was reversible error for the trial court
to charge the jury on sudden emergency 4 when the only reasonable inference
from the evidence was that the defendant's own negligence created or con-
tributed to the emergency.
The full import of this second factual requisite, concerning the conduct
of the actor prior to the emergency, is better appreciated when one considers
this additional language of the Florida supreme court in Bellere:3 5
30. See Hormovitis v. Mutual Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 42 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
31. The matter of instructing the jury on the emergency doctrine is considered in
the text accompanying notes 49-74 infra. In the event of a trial without jury, the defendant
is similarly benefited. The factfinder's evaluation of defendant's conduct is to be guided
by the reduced "emergency" criterion, provided that the first three factual requisites exist.
See King v. Griner, 60 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1952) (jury waived and defendant held liable
because driver's prior negligence caused alleged emergency).
32. See text accompanying notes 52-61, 72, infra, concerning the situation in which it
is factually disputable whether defendant's prior conduct was tortious and contributed to
the peril.
33. 114 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1959).
34. The charge was identified in the opinion, id at 620-21, as being that approved in
Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955). The sudden emergency portion of the charge
in Klepper was as follows: "Where the operator of an automobile by a sudden emergency,
not due to her own negligence, is placed in a position of imminent danger and has in-
sufficient time to determine with certainty the best course to pursue, she is not held to the
same accuracy of judgment as is required under ordinary circumstances, and if she pursues
a course of action to avoid an accident such as a person of ordinary prudence placed in a
like position might choose, she is not guilty of negligence, even though she did not adopt
the wisest choice." 83 So. 2d at 589.
35. 114 So. 2d at 621 (emphasis added). Nelson v. Ziegler, 89 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla.
1956), cited in Bellere, contains virtually the same statement.
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It is equally well settled that the driver of an automobile - a "danger-
ous instrumentality" - is charged with the responsibility of having his
vehicle under control at all times, commensurate with the circum-
stances and the locale, and to maintain a sharp and attentive lookout
in order to keep himself prepared to meet the exigencies of an
emergency within reason and consistent with reasonable care and
caution.
This duty of motorists to "be prepared," to the extent it is honored by the
courts, must result in reducing the force of the emergency doctrine in instances
relating to the fault of the driver. The more fully a driver is held to antici-
pate possible emergencies, the less likely a particular emergency is apt to
be deemed "sudden" and "unexpected" as to him, and thus less consideration
would be given to the driver's need for quick judgment. If a driver is
properly anticipating the likelihood of emergencies as a normal part of
modem traffic conditions and is adjusting his driving thereby (that is, he is
driving "defensively"), it would seem that he is to this extent less likely
to be overwhelmed with panic when a situation of sudden peril does occur.
In other words, with respect to the attempt of anyone to invoke the sudden
emergency doctrine, the question is not merely: Was there an actual or
apparent emergency with respect to this person's subjective situation? One
must also ask: Would there have been an actual or apparent emergency with
respect to the subjective situation of one who had used reasonable care in
this situation prior to the alleged emergency? If this latter question cannot
be answered affirmatively, the second factual requisite for invoking the
emergency doctrine has not been met.36 This interpretation of the second
factual requisite would seem to apply to all actors, drivers or otherwise,
but in the case of a driver a special emphasis, according to language in
Bellere, is put upon the duty to anticipate emergencies due to the "dangerous
instrumentality" involved.37
The basic policy question with respect to the doctrine of sudden emerg-
ency would therefore seem to be this: To what extent should one expect
persons, whether driving motor vehicles or acting otherwise, to be prepared
to anticipate the "exigencies of an emergency"? Perhaps this is but another
way of asking the fruitless question: "How much care is reasonable care?"
with respect to fault liability in general. Even so, such a question must be
answered and necessarily is answered by the decisions of juries and trial
judges, subject to the limits and guidelines of appellate courts and legisla-
tures. This basic question implicitly underlines the subsequent discussion on
the appropriateness of giving an instruction on sudden emergency.
36. See Ellwood v. Peters, 182 So. 2d 281, 288 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966): "The defendant ...
testified he first discovered the plaintiff and realized the existence of an emergency when he
was approximately 35 feet from the point of impact. There is ample evidence to support
a finding that he could and by the use of due diligence should have seen her sooner."
(emphasis added).
37. This is not to say that the language of Bellere indicates a higher standard of care
for motorists. It is to say that the court was suggesting that reasonable care by a motorist
may involve a special amount of caution because of the actual danger involved.
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(b) Nontortious Causation by Actor. The wording of the second
requisite raises the problem of whether the creation of or contribution to
the perilous situation must be by the tortious conduct of the person invoking
the emergency doctrine. What if the person did in fact create or contribute
to the peril, but his conduct in doing so was not tortious? Should he be
allowed to have the emergency he created or contributed to be taken into
account to lessen the standard of conduct expected of him in responding to it?
Although apparently no reported Florida decision explicitly concerns
itself with this question, it does appear that it is necessary in Florida that one's
prior conduct in creating or contributing to an emergency doctrine be tortious
in order to preclude him from the benefit of the emergency doctrine. This
conclusion may be inferred from such Florida decisions as Midstate Hauling
Co. v. Fowler,3s. Klepper v. Breslin,39 Nabelski v. Turner,40 and Dupree v.
Pitts.41 Each of these cases involved the death or injury of a child from being
struck by a motor vehicle. In each case the driver's negligence was at issue,
and the jury was given a sudden emergency instruction concerning his
conduct. It cannot be denied that the driver in each of these cases created
or materially contributed to the emergency, for the crisis in each case would
not even have existed in the absence of the vehicle that struck the child.
Nevertheless, giving the sudden emergency instruction was approved in each
case. This strongly implies that it is necessary for the creation of or contribu-
tion to the emergency to be by the tortious conduct of the person seeking
to invoke the emergency doctrine in order for the doctrine to be denied him.
This conclusion is in harmony with the language, typically employed by the
Florida courts, which speaks of the actor not being entitled to the benefit
of a sudden emergency instruction "when his own negligent action creates
or contributes to the creation of the emergency. '" 4 2
Third Requisite: That Alternative Courses of Action in Meeting the
Emergency Were Open to Such Person, or That There Was an Opportunity
To Take Some Action To Avert the Threatened Casualty. Earlier, it was
observed that a sudden emergency existed only when there was too little
time for deliberate decision and action. Now it should also be noted that
the time must not be so short as to preclude any response at all to the
emergency after it has been perceived. When time is too short for a response
to the peril, the emergency doctrine is not applicable. This does not mean
that the actor who sought the emergency instruction is necessarily culpable. It
38. 176 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1965).
39. 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
40. 173 So. 2d 729 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
41. 159 So. 2d 904 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1964).
42. Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla. 1959) (emphasis added). Also, "One
cannot defend on a theory of sudden emergency when his own negligent action brings it
into existence." Seitner v. Clevenger, 68 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1953) (emphasis added). See
Ellwood v. Peters, 182 So. 2d 281, 284 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966). It is understandable why
the courts normally use the narrower term "negligent" rather than the term "tortious" due
to the prevalence of the issue of the actor's prior negligence in most emergency doctrine
cases.
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simply means that there is no conduct after the apprehension of the peril
that needs to be evaluated by using the reduced criterion that the emergency
doctrine provides.
Two Florida cases are most helpful in illustrating this third factual
requisite. The first, Kreiger v. Crowley,43 involved a two-car collision. Plain-
tiff, driving south on a clear, dark night suddenly saw defendant's headlighted
car in plaintiff's southbound lane. The collision occurred "a fragment of a
second later."44 Plaintiff, obtaining an instruction to the jury on sudden
emergency concerning the issue of his contributory negligence, prevailed at
trial. On appeal, the giving of this instruction was held to be erroneous.
Though the court stated that the evidence did not show the existence of
an actual or apparent emergency (the first factual requisite) or that plaintiff
did not wrongfully contribute to the perilous situation (the second requisite),
it appears that the holding was most strongly based on the fact that "there
was not an opportunity for him [plaintiff] between the instant he saw
defendant's car and the impact to do anything, even to apply his brakes, so
there can be no question of alternative courses." 45 In other words, the third
factual requisite was clearly lacking.
The second case, Ellwood v. Peters,46 involved defendant's automobile
striking the plaintiff, a pedestrian who was crossing at an intersection. In
addition to noting that there was substantial evidence to support the con-
clusion that defendant's negligent conduct prior to the alleged emergency
caused or contributed to the injury, the court upheld the trial judge's refusal
to charge the jury on sudden emergency on the additional ground that the
third factual requisite was not met:47
The facts in the case sub judice do not require the [emergency] charge
to be given for the reason that there was no triable issue with respect
to the standard of defendant's conduct during the brief period which
separated the onset and termination of the alleged emergency situa-
tion. ...
It does not appear that defendant had an opportunity to take any
alternative course of action to avert the accident. . . . [I]t is obvious
he had no opportunity after discovering the emergency situation to
avert the collision.
These two cases properly applied the third factual requisite for invoking
the emergency doctrine and, although there were additional grounds for
both holdings, they are sufficient to show that the third factual requisite
is being applied in Florida.
43. 182 So. 2d 20 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id.
46. 182 So. 2d 281 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
47. Id. at 287, 288.
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Fourth Requisite: That the Action or Course Taken was Such as Would
or Might Have Been Taken by a Person of Reasonable Prudence in the Same
or a Similar Situation. If the facts support the third requisite then the issue
raised by the fourth requisite necessary follows: Did the actor, in responding
to the peril, act with the prudence of "a reasonable man" when confronted
with such an emergency? It is thus required that the actor's conduct, after
he perceives the peril, measure up to an objective standard, albeit a reduced
one. As applied to the motor vehicle driver by the court in Hormovitis v.
Mutual Lumber Co., "even where there may not be time for a conscious
weighing of alternatives, the driver's behavior pattern, his responses, his skill,
must be so educated as to be as good as that of a driver of ordinary com-
petence acting under similar circumstances." 4
It is therefore somewhat misleading to say that the emergency doctrine
reduces the standard of conduct required of the actor. As was suggested
earlier, the standard is the same as in any situation involving the issue of
negligence, that is, what is expected of a reasonably prudent person under
these conditions. A reduction of the quality of conduct required is attrib-
utable to the existing or apparent emergency. But the "standard" is the
same whether the emergency doctrine applies or not. That the doctrine of
sudden emergncy is an exemplification of the required standard of conduct
and not an exception thereto cannot be overemphasized.
INSTRUCTING THE JURY: USE AND POSSIBLE MISUSE OF THE DoCRINE
Referring again to the four requisites for a sudden emergency instruction
to the jury, it is quite clear that these are factual requisites. Therefore,
"where there is evidence sufficient to support a finding as to the existence
of such requisites . . . the instruction [to the jury] should, of course be
given."4 9 A determination that, as a matter of law, there was not sufficient
evidence to support any one of the four requisites would be sufficient to
make the giving of the instruction erroneous.50 As noted earlier, the sudden
emergency doctrine can be applied as a matter of law when the only reason-
able inference from the evidence is the conclusion that all the factual
requisites were fulfilled.51
The trial judge's giving (or refusing to give) a sudden emergency in-
struction has been most often disputed when there is a bona fide factual
issue with respect to the second requisite, namely: whether the party seeking
the instruction negligently created or contributed to the emergency. An
excellent example of this difficulty is found in Midstate Hauling Co. v.
48. 120 So. 2d at 46.
49. Dupree v. Pitts, 159 So. 2d 904, 907 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964) quoting Annot., 80 A.L.R.
2d 5, 17 (1961).
50. See Bellere v. Madsen, 114 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1959) holding that it was reversible error
to give a sudden emergency charge to the jury when the only reasonable inference from the
evidence was that defendant's own negligence created or contributed to the creation of the
emergency, i.e., sufficient evidence was not present to support the second factual requisite.
51. See Hormovitis v. Mutual Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 42 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
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Fowler.52 Plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of his three-year old son,
allegedly caused by the negligent driving of defendant's truck by an employee.
One afternoon the defendant's 72,000 pound tractor-trailer combination was
going south on a straight highway between the crests of two low hills, one
north of the other. The two crests were seven-tenths of a mile apart. Accord-
ing to the driver, he was descending the north hill at over fifty miles per
hour, his view unobstructed, when he saw a boy on a bicycle some distance
ahead on the highway. Approaching within three to five hundred feet of
the boy, the truck now going about forty miles per hour, the driver saw a
cluster of children on each side of the road. He blew his horn, causing the
children to move back. At between one hundred and two hundred feet from
the children, with the driver maintaining his speed at forty miles per hour, the
decedent three-year old started running across the road from the driver's
right to his left. The driver claimed to be driving at no more than "28 or
30, 35 at the most" when he was eighty feet from the child and, upon impact,
to be going twenty-five miles per hour. The driver claimed that he did not
see the decedent child until the child started running across the road from
the cluster of children on the right and thus did not apply his brakes with
intent to stop until that time. When the child started across, the driver
swerved left, crossing the center line. When the child continued running,
the driver turned to the right to go behind him, but the child also reversed
himself and ran into the left front bumper. The driver further testified that,
at a speed of forty-five miles per hour, such a loaded vehicle might take 200 or
more feet to stop and that "when he was back down the road he was depend-
ing on his horn to get the children out of the road."' 3 At the trial, the court
gave instructions on sudden emergency and "darting out." The jury's verdict
was for defendants.
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal made much of the
motorist's duty, when he knows of the presence of children, to anticipate
"childish conduct," to anticipate that a child may suddenly cross the road, to
maintain control of his vehicle and, under appropriate circumstances, even
to stop until the children are out of danger.54 Applying the above duties
of care to the evidence, the court concluded that the negligent conduct of
the defendant created or contributed to the perilous situation and, therefore,
the sudden emergency and darting instruction should never have been given.
The judgment for defendants was reversed and the cause remanded for a
new trial.
The case was then taken to the Florida supreme court. Noting that there
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict absolving the defendants
of negligence, the supreme court reinstated the verdict of the trial court.
The basis for the decision appears to have been that (1) there was a factual
conflict as to the driver's negligence leading up to the emergency that could
only be resolved by the jury and (2) since the sudden emergency instruction
52. 176 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1965), reversing 162 So. 2d 278 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
53. Fowler v. Midstate Hauling Co., 162 So. 2d 278, 280 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). Id. at
279-80.
54. Id. at 280.
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did expressly limit its applicability to "a sudden emergency not due to his
[defendant-driver's] own .negligence" 55 the instruction adequately protected
plaintiff's interests by negating its own applicability if the jury did find that
defendant's prior conduct was negligent and contributed to the emergency. 56
The Florida supreme court's holding in Midstate is logically consistent
with the notion that a sudden emergency instruction is proper when there
is sufficient evidence to support factual findings for all four requisites. The
question, though, is whether such logical consistency is functionally desirable
in a case such as Midstate where the crucial factual issue appears not to be
defendant's conduct after the alleged "sudden emergency" began, but rather
the conduct of defendant leading up to the actual moment of crisis.5r
The giving of the sudden emergency instruction in cases where the key
issue is the conduct of the actor leading up to the time of crisis is an abuse
of the emergency doctrine and prejudicial to the injured plaintiff's rights.
This proposition is based on two grounds. First, the sudden emergency
instruction focuses the jury's attention on the actor's conduct from the time
he confronts the crisis situation.58 Indeed, this is its purpose -to instruct
the jury to judge the actor's response to the sudden emergency by a standard
that takes the need for fast action into account. But in situations where the
main factual issue is the alleged negligence of the actor in the time leading
up to the emergency, this may have the undesirable effect of diverting the
jury's consideration from the key issue: Was this actor proceeding with due
care and caution so as to be prepared to meet the exigencies of possible
emergency situations?
In Midstate, for example, the central factual question to be decided was
not the driver's conduct once the child had darted out in front of him. It
seems reasonably dear from the reported facts that he then performed
reasonably in trying to avoid striking the child. Rather, the questions that
appear to dominate this case are these: Was the driver justified in failing to
bring his vehicle down to a speed at which he could control the vehicle
when he first saw the children? Was it reasonable care for him originally
to rely solely on his horn to keep the children out of danger? Was this
driver fulfilling the motorist's duty, once the presence of children is known,
to anticipate childish conduct?5 9 In other words, was this driver negligent
prior to the emergency and, if so, did his negligent conduct cause the
emergency and the casualty?
55. Midstate Hauling Co. v. Fowler, 176 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1965).
56. See id. at 89-90. A similar basis existed for upholding the "darting" instruction,
i.e., it too was conditioned upon the lack of defendant's negligence. Id. at 88.
57. This same question applies with equal force to Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587
(Fla. 1955).
58. See discussion in Ellwood v. Peters, 182 So. 2d 281, 284-85 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1966).
This argument does presume at least some positive correlation between what juries are told
and what juries do.
59. Cf. discussion accompanying notes 35-37 supra on the Florida supreme court's
statement of the stringent requirements upon motorists to have their vehicles "under
control at all times" and to be reasonably prepared to meet emergencies. Bellere v. Madsen,
114 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla. 1959).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
When the sudden emergency instruction is allowed in such a case as
Midstate, not only is the jury's attention turned away from the conduct of
the actor prior to the emergency; the sudden emergency instruction itself,
despite the qualification "not due to his own negligence," G0 tends to imply
that the peril was sudden and unexpected and thus that the actor did not
breach his duty to be prepared for the unexpected.
The second reason against allowing a sudden emergency instruction in
cases where the main factual issue concerns the actor's conduct leading up to
the emergency is, in part, an answer to a probable objection to this writer's
position. The objection is apt to be that even if, in a given situation, the
central factual issue is the actor's "pre-emergency conduct," the instruction is
still warranted if there is any factual issue at all as to the actor's possible
negligence after the onset of the emergency. Therefore, goes this objection,
the evidence in a case like Midstate warrants the sudden emergency instruction
in order to insure that the jury does not hold the driver to a response to
the emergency (after the child darted in front of him) over and above what
should have been expected of a reasonably prudent person.
The fallacy of the above objection is its failure to consider that the sudden
emergency doctrine is not an exception to but rather an exemplification of
the care required of a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances.
Therefore, any acceptable charge to the jury on the general issue of defend-
ant's negligence would include the reference to the care required under like
circumstances.61 In effect, the jury is being charged correctly with respect to
defendant's conduct both before and after the onset of the emergency. Both
are to be judged by reasonable conduct under "like circumstances."
If this be true, then why not completely abolish sudden emergency
instructions, since the matter is taken care of by a general instruction on
negligence referring to "like circumstances" or similar language? There has
been some thinking and action in this direction as to sudden emergency
and similar instructions such as "unavoidable accident."62 Such charges do
complicate the jury's instructions and may result in a confusion of the basic
issues in a negligence case -causation of injury, violation of a legal duty of
60. Midstate Hauling Co. v. Fowler, 176 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1965) (a mere six-word
qualification in a sudden emergency instruction of ninety-five words).
61. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, §32, at 154 8c n.21. The Florida standard jury in-
struction on negligence is as follows: "Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.
Reasonable care is that degree of care which a reasonably careful person would use under
like circumstances. Negligence may consist either in doing something that a reasonably
careful person would not do under like circumstances or in failing to do something that
a reasonably careful person would do under like circumstances." (emphasis added). TRE
SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS §4.1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FLORIDA INSTRUCrIONS].
62. See Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 30,
43 n.42 (1963) (notes Florida's strict use of "unavoidable accident"); Thode, Imminent
Peril and Emergency in Texas, 40 TExAs L. REv. 441, 461 (1962); Wiehl, Instructing a Jury
in Washington, 36 WASH. L. REv. 378, 382-83 & n.32 (1961). The articles by Green and
Wiehl both refer to the ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§12.02-.03 (1961), which
recommends against giving "unavoidable accident" and emergency or "imminent peril"
instructions.
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care, and assessment of recoverable damages. Even where it is not proposed
that such charges be abolished, it is urged that they not be treated as "inde-
pendent issues" and that their subordinate connection to the basic issue of
negligent conduct be made dear to the jury.63
Criticism of sudden emergency, unavoidable accident, and similar instruc-
tions reflects a growing concern that jury instructions are unmanageably
long and complicated. Efforts toward simplification in many states are taking
the form of the preparation of standard instructions prepared by bar com-
mittees. 64 The Supreme Court of Florida in 1962 appointed the Supreme
Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions. Its initial work covering
the trial of negligence cases, Florida Standard Jury Instructions,65 well
achieved its stated goal: 66
[T]o produce jury instructions that would express the applicable
issues and guiding legal principles briefly and in simple, understand-
able language, without argument, without unnecessary repetition, and
without reliance on negative charges.
The jury instructions in Florida Standard Jury Instructions are a signifi-
cant step forward in greater brevity, clarity, and simplification of the sub-
mission of issues to the jury. As for the basic issue of negligence itself, the
committee recommended against the use of several subordinate charges
that were deemed either argumentative, negative, superfluous, overbalanced
for one side, or more appropriate for argument by counsel, or were deemed
to possess some combination of the above characteristics.6 7 Of special interest
here was the following: 68
The committee recommends that no charge be given on the subject of
sudden emergency. In the circumstances of an emergency, as in "ordi-
nary circumstances," the applicable standard of care is reasonable
care under the circumstances.
Although this obviously represents a striking procedural change in the use
of the sudden emergency doctrine, the following factors somewhat cushion
the force of this change. In its order and opinion authorizing the Florida
Standard Jury Instructions, the Florida supreme court provided that their
adoption is without prejudice to the rights of any litigant objecting to the
approved forms and that it should not intrude upon the responsibility of
the trial judge to charge the jury correctly in each case. 69 It is the trial
judge's responsibility to modify or even to substitute another charge for an
63. See Green, supra note 62, at 42-43. Special indebtedness exists to Green's excellent
discussion of the basic negligence issues, id. at 33-46.
64. See listing of published volumes in FLORIDA INSrRUcrIONs at x, xi.
65. FLORIDA INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 61.
66. F zORIDA INSTRUCTIONs at ix.
67. Id. at §§4.1-4.14.
68. Id. at §4.8.
69. In re Standard Jury Instructions, 198 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1967).
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instruction deemed not to apprise the jury accurately and adequately as to
the law in the case at hand.70 Of particular import to the doctrine of sudden
emergency is the following provision:71
[I]n all circumstances in which the notes accompanying the Florida
Standard Jury Instructions contain a recommendation that a certain
type of instruction not be given, the trial judge may follow such
recommendation unless he shall determine that the giving of such
an instruction is necessary accurately and sufficiently to instruct the
jury, in which event he shall give such instruction as he shall deem
appropriate and necessary; and, in such event, the trial judge shall
state on the record or in a separate order the legal basis of his
determination that such instruction is necessary.
In other words, the basic recommendation of the committee is that sudden
emergency instructions not be given to juries in Florida. This is not a
rejection of the sudden emergency doctrine. Rather, the committee takes
the position that the sudden emergency doctrine is adequately applied to
the facts by the general charge on negligence (and by argument by counsel).
Yet, the door is left open for the trial judge to give a sudden emergency
instruction if he determines that it is necessary to instruct the jury accurately
and sufficiently.
The committee's recommendation against the use of the sudden emerg-
ency instruction, with the trial judge still able to make justifiable exceptions,
is a beneficial safeguard against the misuse of the instruction. In cases such
as Midstate and Klepper, where the main issue is the actor's preemergency
conduct,7 2 it is to be hoped the trial judge will not charge the jury on sudden
emergency as a result of the Florida Standard Jury Instructions recommenda-
tion. Not giving the instruction in these cases will enhance the jury's ability
to grasp the basic issues of negligence, causation, and damages.
There are two situations where a brief and understandable instruction
on sudden emergency ought to be given as a corollary to the general negli-
gence charge. The first of these is where the conclusion that the first three
factual requisites have been met can be established either as a matter of
law or is strongly suggested by a preponderance of the evidence and, in
addition, the crucial factual issue with respect to the actor's conduct is the
fourth factual requisite, whether the actor's response to the emergency was
commensurate with the "reasonable man" standard under these circumstances.
For example, while driver is proceeding cautiously, pedestrian unexpectedly
darts out toward him and driver panics and hits the accelerator rather than
the brake, colliding with another vehicle. It is in a situation like this that
a sudden emergency instruction can be genuinely helpful in fairly posing
the issue of fault liability.
70. Id. at 319-20.
71. Id. at 320.
72. It is in this situation that controversy over the giving or not giving of the instruction
has most frequently occurred in the Florida appellate cases.
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The second situation calling for an emergency instruction is when there
is substantial evidence to indicate that defendant's negligence caused or
contributed to the peril, and there is a bona fide factual dispute as to the
injured plaintiff's contributory negligence concerning plaintiff's response to
that peril73 Here, in addition to the substantive justification for the emerg-
ency doctrine (that plaintiff should not be expected to respond to a sudden
emergency as under normal circumstances) is the further consideration that
plaintiff's conduct under stress was a consequence of defendant's negligence.74
Cases will arise where it will be difficult for the trial judge to decide
if the facts meet the above specifications. The temptation to avoid such
troublesome decisions by simply concluding that the sudden emergency
instruction be abolished in toto is real. But to achieve uniformity at the
expense of jury instructions that concretely apply the law to the particular
facts at hand is to place too great a value on simplicity as an end in itself.
CONCLUSION
Whether or not a special jury instruction is used, there nevertheless
exist two basic grounds of dissatisfaction from a consideration of the sudden
emergency doctrine. First, the "ultimate facts"75 are exceedingly difficult to
ascertain with any degree of confidence. The always difficult task of the
factfinder is made especially arduous by the speed of events in a sudden
emergency situation. Thus, results of litigation are anything but predictable.
Second, when successfully utilized by a defendant in a negligence suit, the
emergency doctrine is one more means whereby the injured party is left
without compensatory relief. It should once again be noted that the sudden
emergency doctrine is an exemplification of rather than an exception to fault
liability based on failure to exercise reasonable care. These two grounds of
dissatisfaction with the emergency doctrine serve to exemplify the two worst
aspects of the law of negligence in general - unpredictability of outcome in
a given case and the lack of relief when "fault" is not present. Therefore, to
73. If the central issue regarding plaintiff's contributory negligence covers his behavior
leading up to the peril, the sudden emergency instruction should not be given for the
same reasons earlier offered for opposing its use in the like situation of defendant's primary
negligence.
74. In at least one state, Texas, the courts to some extent have sought to deal with this
situation as a separate doctrine, "imminent peril," which fully exonerates plaintiff's response,
while terrorized, to the peril negligently created by defendant. See Thode, supra note 62
at 441-51, 456-61, 469-72. Without evaluating the merits of this approach, one is prone
to say that, at the very least, the plaintiff in such circumstances is entitled to an instruction
on the emergency doctrine.
75. Was the actor's conduct leading to the emergency negligent, and did this conduct
create or contribute to the peril causing the injury? If not, was the actor's conduct negli-
gent in response to the emergency, and did this conduct cause the injury? The ultimate
facts are those of any negligence action - breach of duty, causation, damages - applied to a
sudden emergency, if the emergency is found to have actually or apparently existed. De-
termining whether a sudden emergency existed and whether there was a chance for an
alternative response (the first and third factual requisites) may be as difficult as the
proof of the issue of negligence and causation.
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suggest dissatisfaction with the sudden emergency doctrine is also, for identical
reasons, to suggest general dissatisfaction with the concept of fault liability
based on the "reasonable man" standard. At least in the area of motor
vehicle casualties, the sudden emergency doctrine exemplifies the need for
a more certain means of injury compensation than is afforded by the concept
of fault liability.76
WILLIAM G. HOLLINGSWORTH
76. But see Walker, The Gathering Storm in Automobile Injury Compensation: A
Workable Solution, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 151 (1967), for a vigorous defense of fault liability
as well as an excellent survey of the automobile injury compensation problem and some
possible solutions.
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